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Occhialino and Vail: Why the EEOC (Still) Matters

WHY THE EEOC (STILL) MATTERS
Anne Noel Occhialino*and Daniel Vail**
Commission's
Since the Equal Employment Opportunity
("EEOC") creation in 1964, the Commission has had a unique role in enforcing Title VII and other civil rights statutes. In addition to receiving
and investigating charges of discrimination, the EEOC enforces the employment civil rights statutes through Commission-initiated litigation.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that when the EEOC
brings an enforcement action, the EEOC does not merely stand in the
shoes of employees.' Instead, the EEOC is the "master of its own case." 2
This article first traces the history of the EEOC, which shares the
same birthday as Title VII, with a focus on the Commission's charge

processing, investigation, conciliation and litigation practices against
* Anne Noel Occhialino is an attorney in the Office of General Counsel at the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission. Ms. Occhialino litigates on behalf of the EEOC in the United States
Courts of Appeals. She is also an adjunct professor of Legal Writing and Research at The George
Washington University Law School. She is a graduate of Wesleyan University in Middletown, Connecticut and the University of New Mexico School of Law. Following law school, she completed a
two-year clerkship with the Honorable James A. Parker of the United States District Court for the
District of New Mexico. After her clerkship, she was accepted into the Equal Employment Opportunity-National Labor Relations Board Joint Honor Program. As part of that program, she completed a three-month detail to the NLRB's Contempt Litigation Branch in the Division of Enforcement Litigation.
** Daniel Vail is an attorney with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Mr. Vail
works in the Appellate Services Division of the EEOC's Office of General Counsel, where he litigates on behalf of the EEOC in the U.S. Courts of Appeals. Mr. Vail previously worked in the
EEOC's Office of Federal Operations adjudicating EEOC federal sector appellate decisions. Mr.
Vail is the Chair of the D.C. Bar's EEO and Individual Rights Committee (a component of the D.C.
Bar Labor and Employment Law Section). Mr. Vail is a graduate of Harvard Law School and of
Hamilton College.
The views expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not express the views of
the EEOC, the United States, or The George Washington University Law School.
1. See, e.g., Gen. Tel. Co. of the N.W., Inc. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 326 (1980) ("[T]he
EEOC is not merely a proxy for the victims of discrimination ....); Occidental Life Ins. Co. v.
EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 368 (1977) ("[U]nder the procedural structure created by the 1972 amendments, the EEOC does not function simply as a vehicle for conducting litigation on behalf of private
parties; it is a federal administrative agency charged with the responsibility of investigating claims
of employment discrimination and settling disputes, if possible, in an informal, noncoercive fashion.").
2. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 291 (2002).
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private employers. Next, this article describes the Commission's current
charge-processing system and litigation practice. Finally, this article explores the question of whether the EEOC still matters forty years after
Title VII's enactment.
I. FROM "TOOTHLESS TIGER ' 3 TO PRIMARY ENFORCEMENT AGENCY:

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE EEOC
On July 2, 1964, Congress at long last passed the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, an omnibus bill directed at discrimination in employment, voting, education, and public accommodation. 4 Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 19645 prohibited private employers (excluding state and local
governments) from discriminating based on race, color, religion, sex, or7
national origin. 6 Title VII also provided for the creation of the EEOC.
Exactly one year after Congress passed Title VII, the EEOC opened its
doors for business. Since then, the EEOC has been pursuing its congressionally-mandated mission to eliminate unlawful employment discrimination. Although the Commission has made great strides in accomplishing this mission, the EEOC is a long way from declaring "mission
accomplished."
A. 1965-1972
The EEOC's beginnings were less than auspicious. The EEOC
opened its doors on July 2, 1965,8 at which time the Commission resided
in space borrowed from the Department of Commerce, 9 and had no authority to enforce Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The legislative battles that led up to the enactment of the Civil Rights Act had culminated in a compromise that gave the EEOC the authority to receive,
investigate, and conciliate charges of discrimination, to make technical
3. EEOC, EEOC History: 35th Anniversary: 1965-2000, 1965-1971: A "Toothless Tiger"
Helps Shape the Law and Educate the Public, at http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/35th/196571/index.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2005).
4. EEOC, EEOC History: 35th Anniversary: 1965-2000, Pre-1965: Events Leading to the
Creation of EEOC, at http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/35th/pre1965/index.html) (last visited Apr.

15, 2005).
5. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17(b) (2000).
6. Id. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1), e(b).
7. Id. § 2000e-4(a).
8. "Toothless Tiger" Helps Shape the Law, supra note 3.
9. EEOC, EEOC History: 35th Anniversary: 1965-2000, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., First
at
11, 1966,
1965
May
EEOC,
May
26,
of
the
Chairman
http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/35th/bios/roosevelt.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2005).
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studies and provide technical assistance to employers, 10 but not the
authority to sue employers who failed to comply with Title VII." The12
EEOC did have the authority to refer charges to the Attorney General.
It was the Attorney General who had the authority to intervene in civil
actions brought by private individuals under section 70613 and to bring
an action under section 707 against employers who engaged in a pattern
or practice of discrimination. 14
As for the Commission itself, Title VII provided that it would consist of five members appointed by the President and confirmed by the
Senate, with no more than three Commissioners to be appointed from the
same political party.' 5 One member was to be designated the Chairman
startand another the Vice Chairman.' 6 After the Commission's initial
17
up, each Commissioner was to be appointed for a five-year term.
The first five Commissioners took office just a month before the
EEOC began operating. 18 At that time, the EEOC was not yet set up to
deal with the backlog of over one thousand charges of discrimination
that had previously been filed.' 9 Three weeks after the Commission
opened its doors, it had just forty-eight employees, 20 only seven of which
were full-time investigators," with another twenty-four on detail from
other federal agencies.22 None of the investigators were properly trained
to investigate employment discrimination,2 3 and they faced open hostility from employers and the public. In the late 1960s, for instance, "de10. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 705(g)(3), (5), 78 Stat. 241, 258-59
(amended 1972, current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4(g)(3), (5) (2000)).
11. Id. § 706(a), 78 Stat. at 259 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)) (setting forth
EEOC's duties of investigation and conciliation).
12. Id. § 705(g)(6), 78 Stat. at 259 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(g)(6)) (authorizing
EEOC to "refer matters to the Attorney General with recommendations for intervention in a civil
action brought by an aggrieved party under section 706, or for the institution of a civil action by the
Attorney General under section 707").
13. Id. § 902, 78 Stat. at 266-67 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)) (stating that
courts may authorize the Attorney General to intervene in civil actions "of general public importance").
14. Id. § 707(a), 78 Stat. at 261 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a)) (stating that Attorney General may file a "pattern or practice" case).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(a).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. JOHN Ross, EEOC, A HISTORY OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION 1965-1984, at 12 (2000).
19. "Toothless Tiger" Helps Shape the Law, supra note 3.
20. ROSS, supra note 18, at 13.
21.

Id.

22. Id.
23. Id. at 20.
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24
rogatory remarks" were scrawled on investigators' cars in Houston.
Other investigators were arrested, and one investigator was even "gently
urged out of town by a pickup truck loaded with guys and their shot-

guns.

25

In its early years, the EEOC struggled with high turnover of its
Commissioners and Chairmen.26 In its first seven years, the Commission
had thirteen different members. 27 By its fourth year, the EEOC was already on its fourth Chairman.2 8 Not surprisingly, an internal report from
1967 revealed that the EEOC lacked clear guidance, uniformity in its
operation, and good management.29
While the Commissioners were using a revolving door, the agency
struggled to set up field offices. At first, the EEOC ran all of its investigations out of its headquarters in Washington, D.C. 30 Later, the agency
set up regional offices spread out across the country. 31 The location of

the offices, and the assignment of staff, largely correlated with the geographic distribution of the charges the EEOC received. 32 Perhaps not
surprisingly for the 1960s, two-thirds of the EEOC's charges were filed
in the South.33 Another 25% of charges came from the industrial Midwest.34 Accordingly, the EEOC set up many of its first field offices in
these areas.35
Even with its new field offices, however, the EEOC could not keep
up with the deluge of charges it was receiving. 36 The number of charges
the EEOC was expected to receive had been vastly underestimated; it
was predicted to receive about two thousand charges in its first year, but
the actual figure was 8,852. 3 ' By 1969, that number had more than dou24.

EEOC, MAKING A RIGHT A REALITY: AN ORAL HISTORY OF THE EARLY YEARS OF THE

EEOC 1965-1972, at 19 (Sylvia Eisner Danovitch, ed. 1990) (statement of Edith Morgan).
25. Id. at 18 (statement of Everett Crosson).
26.

ROSS, supra note 18, at 13.

27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 20.
30. Id.at 13, 15.
31. Id. at 15.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See id. The EEOC opened its first field office in Dallas, Texas in 1966 and subsequently
opened additional offices in Atlanta, Chicago, Cleveland, Los Angeles, New York, New Orleans,
Albuquerque, Kansas City, Washington, D.C., Birmingham, Ala. and San Francisco. Id.
36. Id. at 22. Paradoxically, the opening of the field offices themselves, which created greater
public awareness of the EEOC and made it easier to file charges, contributed to the dramatic increase in charges filed. See id.
37. Id.at 18.
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bled.38 Unfortunately, the EEOC could not keep up with the influx of
new cases, and by 1968, the average time it took to process a charge was
sixteen months (and growing). 39 The majority of the charges involved
race discrimination (one-third were initiated by the NAACP) 40 and were
filed on behalf of black employees and applicants who alleged race discrimination in hiring and promotion, selection and testing practices, and
the maintenance of segregated seniority systems. 4 1 These charges alleged
both "disparate treatment" (i.e., that individuals had been the target of
purposeful unlawful employment actions) and "disparate impact" discrimination (i.e., that facially neutral policies or practices had a disproportionate impact based on race).42
The EEOC issued guidelines on sex discrimination in 1965 in order
to better address the unexpectedly high number of sexual discrimination
charges filed in the first year.43 Among other things, these guidelines
stated that refusing to hire or promote women because they were married
or had children constituted sex discrimination, unless men were treated
equally in similar situations.4 4 The Supreme Court later embraced the
Commission's interpretation on this issue in Phillips v. Martin Marietta
45

Corp.

The EEOC used conciliation agreements to resolve some of the tens
of thousands of charges received its first few years.46 In its first year
alone, the EEOC reached conciliation agreements with 11 1 employers,47
many of which desegregated workplace facilities, including bathrooms
and cafeterias. 48 In one highly publicized agreement, which was negotiated with other federal agencies, the Newport News Shipbuilding and
Drydock Company agreed to desegregate its workplace, give equal pay
to black workers, and provide black workers with equal opportunities to
38. See id. at 19 (Figure 5).
39. Id. at 22.
40. Id. at 21; "Toothless Tiger" Helps Shape the Law, supra note 3.
41. EEOC, EEOC History: 35th Anniversary: 1965-2000, 1965-1971: Shaping Employment
Discrimination Law, at http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/35th/1965-71/shaping.html (last visited
April 13, 2005).
42. See id. The EEOC interpreted Title VII to prohibit disparate impact discrimination as well
as disparate treatment, a position later adopted by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424 (1971). Id.
43. Id. The EEOC expanded these guidelines in 1966, 1968 and 1972. Id.
44. Id.
45. 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
46. See discussion of EEOC's conciliation process infra Section ll.A.2.
47. EEOC, EEOC History: 35th Anniversary: 1965-2000, 1965-1971: Early Enforcement Efforts, at http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/35th/1965-71/early-enforcement.html (Apr. 13, 2005).
48. Id.
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participate in apprenticeship programs and to compete for supervisory
49
and craft jobs.
In addition to effectuating the purpose of Title VII through conciliation and the issuance of guidelines interpreting the Act, 50 the EEOC filed
amicus curiae briefs and even intervened in some cases.51 In 1971,52 for
example, the EEOC participated in more than 500 cases. 53 The EEOC
also contributed to the enforcement of Title VII by referring "pattern or
practice" cases to the Department of Justice for litigation.5 4 Initially, this
referral process proceeded at a snail's pace. During the EEOC's first ten
months, it referred only one pattern or practice case to the Attorney
General. 55 By July of 1968, however, the EEOC had referred sixty-eight
such cases to the Attorney General, who had taken action in just twelve
of them and had filed a mere nine pattern or practice cases. 56 By 1972,
the Attorney General had filed fewer than one hundred pattern or prac57
tice cases.
Accordingly, from 1965-1972, the EEOC had mixed results in effectuating Title VII's purpose of eliminating unlawful employment discrimination,58 and the enthusiasm that initially greeted the enactment of
Title VII and the creation of the EEOC waned. There was a sense in
some quarters that "people were not getting what they thought they
would get out of it, and that was instant results., 59 Fortunately, Congress
soon addressed Title VII's limitations by increasing the EEOC's role in
enforcing it.

49. See id.
50. The EEOC issued Guidelines on Religious Discrimination in 1966, and Guidelines on
National Origin Discriminationin 1970. Shaping Employment Discrimination Law, supra note 41.
The EEOC has continued to issue numerous guidelines and other policy statements throughout the
years. See, e.g., Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604 (2005); Affirmative
Action Appropriate Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as Amended, 29 C.F.R. § 1608;
EEOC, NOTICE NO. 915.002, "ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: VICARIOUS EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR
UNLAWFUL
HARASSMENT
BY
SUPERVISORS"
(June
18,
1999),
available at

http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/harassment.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2005).
51. ROSS, supra note 18, at 23.
52. All references to EEOC statistics are measured by fiscal year, not by calendar year.
53. Ross, supra note 18, at 23.
54. Id. Section 707 of the Civil Rights Act refers to "pattern or practice" cases, as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a) (2000).
55. ROSS, supra note 18, at 23.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See id.
59. MAKING A RIGHT A REALITY, supra note 24, at 15 (statement of Willie King).
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B. 1972-1980
The most dramatic change in the history of the EEOC occurred
when Congress passed the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of
1972,6° which amended Title VII. Congress recognized that Title VII's
failure to imbue the EEOC with enforcement authority was a "serious
defect,, 6 effectively making the Commission a "toothless tiger." To
give the EEOC some bite, Congress provided the agency the authority to
enforce Title VII against private employers either by filing suit under
section 707.62
section 706 or by filing a pattern or practice case under
Congress also expanded the reach of Title VII to cover discrimination by
state and local governments, although the Attorney General was given
63
(and retains) the authority to sue these employers. As a result, the focus
of the EEOC's mission shifted from mere investigation and conciliation
to litigation against private employers.
The agency's litigation efforts, however, were hampered by its
struggle to keep its head above a rising sea of charges. Due in part to the
1972 amendments' expansion of Title VII's coverage to state and local
governments, the EEOC received more charges than ever before. In
1972, the EEOC received 32,840 charges.64 The next year, that number
increased by 50% to 48,849.65 The time it took for the EEOC to process

60. EEOC, EEOC History: 35th Anniversary: 1965-2000, The 1970s: The "Toothless Tiger"
at
Enforcement,
of
Era
New
A
Teeth
Its
Gets
http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/35thl970s/index.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2005).
61. Harrison A. Williams, Jr., Foreword, in SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC
WELFARE, 92ND CONG., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACT
OF 1972 (Comm. Print 1972) (providing complete history of the 1972 amendments).

62. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (2000) (stating that following the failure of conciliation,
"the Commission may bring a civil action against any respondent not a government, governmental
agency, or political subdivision named in the charge"); id. § 2000e-6(a) (authorizing Attorney Gen-

eral to bring "pattern or practice" cases in appropriate federal district courts); id. § 2000e-6(c)
(transferring Attorney General's power to bring pattern or practice suits to the EEOC).

63. See id.§ 2000e-(b) (defining "employer" as a person "engaged in an industry affecting
commerce"); id. § 2000e-(a) (defining "person" to include, inter alia, "governments, governmental
§ 2000e-5(f)(1). Section 5(f)(1) states that
agencies, [and] political subdivisions"); see also id.
in the case of a respondent which is a government, governmental agency, or political
subdivision, if the Commission has been unable to secure from the respondent a conciliation agreement acceptable to the Commission, the Commission shall take no further action and shall refer the case to the Attorney General who may bring a civil action ....

Id.
64.

ROSS, supra note 18, at 110.

65.

Id.
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a charge by mid-1975 had risen to an average of thirty-two months.6 6 By
1977, the EEOC had a backlog of 94,700 unresolved charges.
This backlog persisted despite the EEOC's October 1972 implementation of a critical change in its charge-processing system. Previously, the Commissioners had personally decided whether to make a
finding of reasonable cause for each charge, 68 which had considerably
slowed charge processing. At the end of 1972, however, the Commission
delegated to the directors of the EEOC's district offices the authority to
issue letters of determination in cases in which where there was Commission precedent. Only cases presenting novel or unsettled issues went
to the Commissioners for decision.69
Besides facing a sizeable charge backlog in the 1970s, the EEOC
found itself confronting organizational challenges. Most significantly,
the EEOC had to develop in-house litigation capacity to implement its
new enforcement authority.7 0 To accomplish this task, the EEOC created
five regional litigation centers that evaluated cases and then forwarded
litigation recommendations to Headquarters for review. 71 Initially, the
EEOC's litigation machinery operated slowly. In 1972, 1,319 cases were
referred to the litigation centers,72 but only 124 were approved for filing
and only five lawsuits were filed. 73 However, the pace picked up dramatically the next year, when the EEOC filed 116 lawsuits (although
that figure dipped to just ninety-four the next year).74
According to external studies, three factors hindered the EEOC's
enforcement efforts in the early to mid-1970s.75 First, the EEOC's
organizational problems resulted in confusion over the roles and
authority of key policy-making and management personnel.7 6 Second,
the EEOC continued to suffer from vastly inadequate staffing. 7 Third,
the EEOC had relatively poor management. 78 The Commission did not
66. Id. at 114.
67.

"Toothless Tiger" Gets Its Teeth, supra note 60. Ironically, another cause of the surge in

charges was the EEOC's own success. For example, after the entry of a consent decree against
AT&T, charge filing against the company and its affiliates rose by 60%. ROSS, supra note 18, at
114.
68. ROSS, supra note 18, at 110.

69. Id.
70.
71.

Id. at 122.
Id. The litigation centers were located in Atlanta, San Francisco, Denver, Philadelphia,

and Chicago. Id.
72. Id. at 123.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 125.

75.

Id. at 96.

76. Id.
77. Id. During the year after the 1972 amendments, the Office of General Counsel had 105
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had relatively poor management. 78 The Commission did not have a central office that was responsible for internal policy decisions, 79 no central
training office, and no comprehensive manuals for investigators, conciliators, or litigators. 80 Other factors that contributed to the Commission's ineffectiveness in instituting section 706 cases included inadequate investigations and, because of the lengthy charge-processing time,
evidence that grew stale before trial.8 '
The EEOC was also slow to initiate section 707 pattern or practice
cases. During the two years following the 1972 amendments, the EEOC
and the Attorney General had concurrent jurisdiction to bring pattern or
practice cases, but the EEOC did not bring any at all. 82 When responsibility for bringing such suits against private employers shifted from the
Attorney General to the EEOC in March of 1974, the Commission inherited eighty such cases.83 Having failed to bring any pattern or practice
cases in the previous two years, however, the EEOC was ill-equipped to
deal with them. 84 The Commission also had no coordinated mechanism
for selecting these cases from its charge inventory or from data it gathered from employers.85
Despite the EEOC's rocky transition from a strictly administrative
agency to an administrative and enforcement agency, the Commission
did enjoy some success. Even before the 1972 amendments, the EEOC
had targeted systemic discrimination at AT&T after receiving more than
1,500 charges against the company. 86 In 1973, along with the Departments of Justice and Labor, the EEOC entered into a settlement agreement with AT&T in which the company agreed to end sex-segregated
job categories, institute goals for the hiring, training, and promotion of
women and minorities, and pay $45 million in back pay and wage adjustments for women and other minority employees.87 Also in 1973, the
vacancies out of 270 spots. Id. The Regional Litigation Centers had a 35% vacancy rate. Id. at 101.
78. Id. at 96.
79. Id. at 102.
80. See id. at 103.
81. Id. at 123-24.
82. Id. at 124; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(c) (2000) (stating that on March 24, 1974, the
Attorney General was to transfer to the EEOC the function of bringing pattern or practice cases under section 707); id. § 2000e-6(e) (stating that after March 24, 1972, the EEOC "shall have authority
to investigate and act on a charge of a pattern or practice of discrimination").
83. Ross, supra note 18, at 124.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 125.
87. See id. at 125-26. In another agreement reached the following year, AT&T agreed to pay
another $30 million to 25,000 female and minority management-level employees. Id.
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EEOC set up investigative task forces for some of the nation's largest
employers - General Electric, General Motors, Ford, and Sears. Five
years later, the EEOC entered into a conciliation agreement with General
Electric that provided $29.4 million for minorities and women, and set
hiring and promotion goals. 89 The EEOC also filed suit in 1974 against
the nine largest steel producers in the country and the major steelworkers
union. 90 Within six months, the EEOC had a consent decree in hand that
provided nearly $31 million in back pay to 40,000 female and other minority employees, and set hiring goals and timetables. 91
Within a few years of the 1972 amendments, the EEOC also began
to address some of the obstacles impeding its effectiveness. Responding
to a lack of guidance for attorneys and investigators, in 1973 the Commission issued its "Compliance Manual," which contained "guidelines
and procedures for conducting investigations, conciliation proceedings,
and compliance reviews., 92 A few years later, the EEOC also issued a
"General Counsel's Manual," which offered guidance on how to select
93
and litigate cases.94
The EEOC also made headway in addressing its inadequate staffing.
The Commission's enforcement of Title VII also began to pick up
in the mid-1970s. In 1975, the agency filed thirty-nine pattern or practice
96
lawsuits. 95 In 1976, the EEOC filed lawsuits or intervened in 484 cases.
The agency also continued to do brisk business at the appellate level,
both as a litigant, and through submission of amicus curiae briefs. 97 De-

88. EEOC, EEOC History: 35th Anniversary: 1965-2000, The 1970s: Focusing Enforcement
Efforts on Systemic Discrimination, at http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/35th/1970s/focusing.html
(last visited Apr. 15, 2005).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. Some criticized the settlement, however, because it required employees to waive their
right to sue, it capped back pay awards at only $1,000, and it awarded most minorities a trifling
$250. Ross, supra note 18, at 127.
92. Ross, supra note 18, at 103.
93. Id.
94. Id. Although the number of vacancies in the Office of General Counsel and in regional
litigation centers stayed above average, by February 1975, the Commission's overall vacancy rate
had decreased to 7.6%. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
at 125.
97. Id.
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spite these improvements, the EEOC had an "urgent" need for reform.98
Indeed, by 1977, the EEOC had 130,000 pending charges. 99
The need for reform was met, in part, by the EEOC's 1977 reorganization plan.'0 0 The plan called for a major reorganization of the
EEOC's functions, structure, and procedures, in order to "improve the
enforcement of Title VII" by improving problem areas such as "case
processing, litigation of significant cases, [and] internal management and
information systems ... ."101 One significant structural reform moved
enforcement attorneys from the five regional litigation centers to district
offices, where the attorneys could work hand-in-hand with investigators
to cultivate more "litigation worthy" cases. 10 2 Another change was the
adoption of the "Rapid Charge-Processing System" ("RCP system") to
speed "the resolution of new charges."' 0 3 Under this system, trained investigators (not clerical staff)'0 4 conducted initial intake interviews and
counseled individuals about their charges. This allowed allegations falling outside the Commission's jurisdiction to be re-directed to an "appropriate agency or organization" according to the circumstances or subject matter. 10 5 Intake officers also conducted fact-finding conferences
with charging parties, which became the primary investigatory tool in
individual cases. 10 6 Because long delays in charge processing had created potentially large back pay awards, which in turn deterred employers
from settling cases, the RCP system also emphasized the early resolution
of charges to promote settlement. 0 7 The reorganization was largely successful: between 1978 and 1981, the number of pending charges dropped
from 95,000 to less than 50,000.08
As part of the reorganization, and to address concerns that the
EEOC was overlooking cases of systemic discrimination, the EEOC im-

98. Id. at 104 (attributing need for reform to mounting criticism of the Commission, as well as
the possibility of increased authority and responsibility for the Commission created by a task force
appointed by President Carter in 1977 to examine the government's progress in equal employment).
99. Id. at 107.
100. Id. at 104.
101. Id. at 104-05.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 107, 114.

104. EEOC, EEOC History: 35th Anniversary: 1965-2000, The 1970s: Prelude to the 1980sat
Authority,
Expanded
and
Reorganization
http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/35th/1970s/prelude.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2005).
105.

ROSS, supra note 18, at 114.

106. Id.
107.

Id. at 115.

108. Prelude to the 1980s - Reorganization and Expanded Authority, supra note 104.
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plemented the Systemic Charge Processing system.' 0 9 As part of this
system, the EEOC created the Office of Systemic Programs.10 The new
office, which was housed in the EEOC's headquarters, used information
from "EEO-1" reports - annual reports that large employers are required to file with the EEOC reporting employee data by race/ethnicity,
gender, and job category - to target specific employers engaging in systemic discrimination.1 11 This office also helped to implement systemic
programs in the district offices by providing the extensive technical assistance needed to litigate systemic discrimination cases, establishing
criteria to use for screening companies for systemic charges, and developing procedures for targeting employers for pattern or practice cases. 112
One year after the EEOC devised this reorganization plan, President
Carter did some of his own reorganizing. Through two presidential initiatives, the responsibility for enforcing the Equal Pay Act of 1963 (the
"EPA") 13 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (the
,ADEA,)1 was transferred from the Labor Department to the EEOC. 115
The EEOC gained even more responsibility when Congress amended Title VII by enacting the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978.116 Consequently, the EEOC's authority and responsibilities increased significantly as the agency entered its next decade.
C. 1980s
The 1980s era was "a time of change and reassessment for the
Commission."' 17 The agency continued to make significant progress towards achieving its mission of eradicating employment discrimination
by litigating systemic and individual cases of discrimination and by entering into numerous settlements with employers. However, the EEOC

109.
110.

ROSS, supra note 18, at 120.

Id.
111. Id. at 129; 29 C.F.R. §§ 1602.7-14 (2004) (regulations requiring employers covered under
Title VII to file EEO-1 reports annually).
112. ROSS, supra note 18, at 120-21.

113. 29 U.S.c. § 206(d) (2000).
114. Id. §§ 621-34.
115. Prelude to the 1980s - Reorganization and Expanded Authority, supra note 104. President Carter also transferred to the EEOC the responsibility for all federal equal employment opportunity requirements, including section 717 of Title VII, the EPA, the ADEA, and sections 501 and
505 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. See id.
116. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000).
117. EEOC, EEOC History: 35th Anniversary: 1965-2000, The 1980s: A Period of Change and
Reassessment, at http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/35th/1980s/index.html (last visited Apr. 12,
2005).
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faced a number of obstacles in the 1980s that hindered its ability to fully
achieve its mission, including: (1) a further explosion in the number of
charges it received (2) staff reduction and (3) changes in its charge-filing
system. 118
The first significant hurdle the EEOC had to overcome in the 1980s
was the massive influx of new charges it received. Although the EEOC
had received an astounding 446,000 charges in the 1970s, the agency
was inundated with 683,000 charges.1 19 The agency's assumption of au120
thority to enforce the ADEA and the EPA contributed to the increase.
In the beginning of the 1980s, age discrimination was the EEOC's fastest-growing enforcement area.' 21 The explosion in charges was not,
however, entirely attributable to the ADEA and the EPA. The Commission also experienced an increase in the number of sex discrimination
charges, with the number22of individuals charges filed rising to 180,000
by the end of the decade.'
Unfortunately - and unfairly - Congress failed to increase the
EEOC's funding commensurate with its increased enforcement authority. This deficiency in funding was a major obstacle the EEOC faced in
the 1980s. 123 As a result of budget shortfalls and inflation, the EEOC actually had to reduce its staff-just as the numbers of charges it was receiving skyrocketed." 24 While the EEOC had 3,752 authorized positions
in 1979, eight years later, that number had shrunk to 2,941.125
A third hurdle the EEOC encountered in the 1980s was the adoption of a new enforcement philosophy that "focused on obtaining effecshf
,,126
This shift
tive redress for every individual victim of discrimination.
of
the
decade
in
the
early
part
came
about
philosophy
in enforcement
118. See id;see also EEOC, EEOC History: 35th Anniversary: 1965-2000, The 1980s: End of
at
Challenges,
Face
New
EEOC
to
Leaves
the
1980s
http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/35th/1980s/end.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2005).
119. End of the 1980s Leaves EEOC to Face New Challenges, supra note 118.
120. EEOC, EEOC History: 35th Anniversary: 1965-2000, The 1980s: Enforcement Efforts in
the 1980s, at http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/35thi/1980s/enforcement.html (last visited Apr. 12,

2005).
For instance, in 1979, the EEOC received about 1,600 ADEA charges; the next
121. See id.
year that figure jumped more than 300% to 6,700. Id. This increase continued unabated throughout
the decade as corporate America downsized its workforce. Id. In 1986, Congress also lowered the
age cap under the ADEA from seventy years of age to just forty, thereby substantially increasing the
number of workers who fell under the ADEA's protection. Id; see also 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (2000)
(stating that the ADEA protects "individuals who are at least 40 years of age").
122. Enforcement Efforts in the 1980s, supra note 120.
123. End of the 1980s Leaves EEOC to Face New Challenges, supra note 118.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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when a Republican administration replaced a Democratic one. 27 While
the EEOC had been focusing on systemic discrimination, the new administration redirected the agency's focus to the enforcement of individual claims of discrimination. 128 As a practical matter, this philosophical
shift meant retooling the agency's charge-processing system. Although
the RCP system of the 1970s had largely succeeded in expediting the
resolution of new charges, 129 an internal study concluded that "in an effort to reduce the charge backlog, the pendulum of the Commission had
swung too far in the direction of early settlement through' 30RCP, and both
the quality and thoroughness of investigations suffered."'
The new Commission therefore abandoned the RCP system in favor
of a policy that required a full investigation of each charge. 131The policy
also stated that all cases in which the EEOC had found cause to believe
discrimination occurred would presumptively be litigated if conciliation
failed and that the Commission would undertake a review of each conciliation failure to determine whether to file a lawsuit.132 Parties alleging
discrimination were also allowed to seek review if the Commission
found that none had occurred. 133 These policies, exacerbated by the
EEOC's increased enforcement authority and inadequate Congressional
funding, exhausted a substantial amount of the Commission's time and
resources. 134
Despite these three obstacles, the agency continued to make some
inroads in its battle against employment discrimination. In the early
1980s, the EEOC resolved a number of systemic discrimination cases it
had initiated in the 1970s, most of which concerned discrimination
against racial and ethnic minorities and women. 35 In 1981, the EEOC
filed 364 lawsuits - an increase of almost 150 from the preceding

127.

The 1980s: A Period of Change and Reassessment, supra note 117.

128. Id.
129.

Id; see also Ross, supra note 18, at 179 ("The substantial changes made in the Commis-

sion's operations and programs achieved one of the primary goals -

reduction of the charge back-

log.").

130.

RosS, supranote 18, at 185-86.

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

End of the 1980s Leaves EEOC to Face New Challenges, supra note 118.
Id.
Id.
Id. The EEOC had 3,752 staff positions in 1979, but had only 2,941 positions in 1987. Id.
Enforcement Efforts of the 1980s, supra note 120. For instance, in 1980 the EEOC en-

tered into a conciliation agreement with Ford Motor Company that awarded $23 million to minorities and women for discrimination in hiring and promotion practices, among other affirmative relief.
Id. A settlement between EEOC and the Associated Press awarded affirmative relief of $2 million to
minorities and women. Id.
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year.136 The agency's decision in the 1970s to integrate its attorneys with
its investigative staff also enhanced the quantity and quality of the
EEOC's litigation. 137 Another factor that contributed to the EEOC's improved litigation practice was the adoption in 1979 of the "Early Litigation Identification" program. 38 This program identified both old and
new charges that required more than the usual level of attorney involveworked together on these cases,
ment.139 Attorneys and investigators
140
many of which were class charges.
The EEOC also achieved significant victories in court, one of
which strengthened the EEOC's role as an enforcement agency. Early in
the decade, the Supreme Court affirmed that the EEOC has a unique and
important role in enforcing Title VII in General Telephone Co. v.
EEOC.14 1 In that case, the Supreme Court held that the EEOC could seek
class-wide relief without complying with the requirements of Rule 23 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures for class actions. 42 The Court emphasized that "the EEOC is not merely a proxy for the victims of discrimination" and that "[w]hen the EEOC acts, albeit at the behest of and
vindicate the public
for the benefit of specific individuals, it acts also to
' 43
interest in preventing employment discrimination."'
Nevertheless, at the end of the decade, the EEOC continued to
struggle with its unique role in enforcing Title VII, and, more specifically, with how to balance a burgeoning docket of charges with its litigation effort.
D. 1990s
As it had in the 1980s, the EEOC gained additional enforcement responsibilities during the 1990s and saw a record-breaking increase in the
number of charges it received. 44 Following the same pattern that had
plagued the agency since its inception, Congress failed to give the EEOC
45
adequate funding to keep up with its expanded enforcement authority,
136.

See Ross, supra note 18, at 198. However, the number of lawsuits filed dropped to 164 in

1982. Id.
137. Id.at 197.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. 446 U.S. 318 (1980).
142. Id.at320.
143. Id. at 326.
144. See End of the 1980s Leaves EEOC to Face New Challenges, supra note 118.
145. EEOC, EEOC History: 35th Anniversary: 1965-2000, The 1990s: New Enforcement
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making it necessary for the agency to devise "more strategic and systematic" ways to keep up with its charge backlog.146 Many of the
innovative approaches undertaken as a result remain core components of
the Commission's practices today.
During the 1990s, Congress enacted three civil rights statutes that
increased the EEOC's oversight. First, in 1990 Congress passed the
Americans with Disabilities Act (the "ADA"), which prohibits discrimination against individuals who currently have, previously had, or are regarded as having, a disability. 14 7 In addition to shaping the new law by
enacting ADA regulations and policy guidance, 148 the EEOC advanced
its interpretation of the ADA through litigation against private employers. By July 2000, the EEOC had filed 375 ADA lawsuits and filed
amicus curiae briefs in another eighty-seven cases concerning the ADA,
the Rehabilitation Act (the ADA's precursor for federal employees), and
various other state disability laws.149 The EEOC's litigation efforts were
largely successful. The Commission favorably resolved 91% of the cases
through settlement or jury verdict.' 50
The second statute Congress enacted was the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act of 1990 (the "OWBPA"), 15' which amended the
ADEA. Among other things, the statute adopted the EEOC's "equal cost
rule," which stated that employers had to either provide equal benefits 52or
incur equal costs for the benefits given to younger and older workers.'
In 1999, Congress enacted a third statute that impacted the EEOC's
enforcement efforts - the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (the "CRA").15 3 The
CRA provided that, for the first time, plaintiffs in Title VII and ADA
Strategies
to
Address
Discrimination
in
the
Changing
Workplace,
at
http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/35th/1990s/newenforcement.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2005).
146. See id.
147. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213, § 12102(2)

(2000).
148. EEOC, EEOC History: 35th Anniversary: 1965-2000, The 1990s: The Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, at http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/35th/1990s/ada.html (last visited Apr.
15, 2005); 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630, 1641 (2004).
149. EEOC History, The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, supra note 148.

150. Id. For instance, in 1993 the EEOC entered into a consent decree resolving a claim that a
union's health insurance plan violated the ADA because it limited lifetime benefits for AIDS to
$50,000, while the limit for other catastrophic conditions was $500,000. Id. The EEOC also won a
1997 jury verdict against Wal-Mart after it refused to hire an individual who used a wheelchair. Id.
151.

Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.

§§

621-626

(2000)).
152, See 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2)(B)(i) (2000); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1625.10 (2004) (entitled
"Costs and Benefits under Employee Benefit Plans").
153. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42

U.S.C., 29 U.S.C. and 2 U.S.C.).
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cases had the right to a jury trial and to recover compensatory and punitive damages in cases in which an employer had intentionally discriminated.1 54 The CRA provided caps, however, on the amount of such damages that could be recovered.155 The CRA also responded to a series of
Supreme Court decisions, some of which had made56 it more difficult for
plaintiffs to win employment discrimination cases. 1
As in other decades, new statutes brought more charges. During the
1990s, the Commission faced the largest increase in charges in its history.157 The agency received almost 170,000 charges of age discrimination and received a significant number of disability-related charges.159
Nevertheless, race discrimination continued to make up 38% of all
charges, 60 followed closely by sex discrimination charges at 30%. 16 Although the charge-filing increase was clearly attributable in part to the
and harassment also
new statutes, public awareness of discrimination
62
appeared to contribute to the increase. 1
In the mid-1990s, the EEOC adopted Priority Charge Handling
Procedures ("PCHP") to improve charge-processing in the private sector
due to the agency's increasingly heavy workload. 163 The PCHP had
dramatic and immediate results. In the span of two years, from 1996 to
1998, the number of pending charges dropped 47%, from 98,269 to

154. EEOC, EEOC History: 35th Anniversary: 1965-2000, The 1990s: The Civil Rights Act of
1991, at http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/35th/1990s/civilrights.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2005); see
42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c) (2000) (right to a jury trial); id. §§ 1981a(a)(l), (3) (plaintiff may recover
compensatory and punitive damages from employer for intentional discrimination, subject to caps
based on number of employees in subject workplace).
155. EEOC History, The Civil Rights Act of 1991, supra note 154; see 42 U.S.C. §
1981 a(b)(3).
156. EEOC History, The Civil Rights Act of 1991, supra note 154. Two of the cases addressed
by the CRA were Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), and Wards Cove Packing Co.
v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989). Id.
157. New Enforcement Strategies to Address Discrimination in the Changing Workplace, supra note 145. Charge receipts grew from 59,000 in 1989 to 91,000 in 1994. Id.
158. Id.
159. EEOC, EEOC History: 35th Anniversary: 1965-2000, The 1990s: Supreme Court in the
1990s, at http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/35th/1990s/supremecourt.html (last visited Apr. 15,
2005).
160. EEOC, EEOC History: 35th Anniversary: 1965-2000, The 1990s: Furthering the Protecat
and
Harassment,
Discrimination
Against
Workplace
tion
http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/35th/1990s/furthering.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2005).
161. Id.
162. See id. Two popular movies - Philadelphia and Disclosure - made employment discrimination a hot topic even at the box office. Id.
163. EEOC, EEOC Combined Annual Reports Fiscal Years 1996-1998, § IV, at
http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/annual-reports/annrep96-98.html (April 12, 2005); see also PCHP
discussion infra at section II.A.1.
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52,011.164 Also in 1995, the agency "adopted resolutions recommended

by an internal task force on Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)... to
ADR program to supplement [the
implement a mediation-based 165
agency's] investigative process."
In 1995, the Commission adopted a National Enforcement Plan
66
("NEP") to improve its enforcement efforts throughout the agency.'
The NEP reflects the agency's recognition of its persistent budget constraints and the fact that the policies of the 1980s, which had been built
on the principle of "full investigation and enforcement," had actually
hindered the Commission's ability to pursue its mission of eradicating
employment discrimination.1 67 Accordingly, the NEP purports to maximize "strategic enforcement" - that is, to ensure "the most effective use
of the Commission's resources by assuring that available funds are devoted to efforts which have the potential to yield the greatest dividends
in achieving equal employment opportunity.' ' 168 The NEP articulates the
general principles governing the Commissions' enforcement efforts, establishes national enforcement priorities, sets general parameters for the
development of the Local Enforcement Plans, and delegates significant
litigation authority to the Office of General Counsel so that the Commission can most effectively and efficiently accomplish its enforcement objectives. 161
More specifically, the NEP articulates the EEOC's "three-pronged
approach to eliminate discrimination in the workplace: (1) prevention
and
through education and outreach; (2) voluntary resolution of disputes;
' 70
(3) when voluntary resolution fails, strong and fair enforcement."'
As a result of the NEP and other agency efforts, the EEOC's efficiency increased in the late 1990s. In addition to significantly reducing
its charge backlog, the EEOC was able to decrease the average chargeprocessing time from 379 days in 1996 to 310 days in 1998. 7' t The
agency also increased the monetary benefits it recovered on behalf of
164. Id.
165. Id.; see discussion of EEOC's mediation program infra sections I.E. and II.A.3.
166. EEOC, National Enforcement Plan, § 1,at http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/plan/nep.html
(last modified Jan. 15, 1997).
167. Id.

168. Id. § 11.
169. Id. § I. The NEP requires leaders in local EEOC offices to create local enforcement plans
consistent with the NEP, but to tailor them to reflect issues faced by relevant local communities and
constituencies. Id. § IV.

170. Id. § I1.
171. Combined Annual Reports, supra note 163, § IV. The "reasonable cause rate," the percentage of charges in which the EEOC finds cause to believe unlawful discrimination occurred, rose
from 2.2% in 1996 to 4.6% in 1998. Id.
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charging parties through conciliation and settlement. Between17 21996 and
1998, that figure grew from $145.2 million to $169.2 million.
Not all cases, of course, were resolved through conciliation, mediation, or settlement. As it had before, the EEOC continued to make inroads in the fight against employment discrimination through litigation.
The agency was again criticized for improperly balancing its dual goals
of combating individual and systemic discrimination. 17 3 The amount of
money the EEOC secured for individuals in cases of systemic discrimination varied widely in the 1990s. In 1996, the EEOC recovered
$1,934,412, in 1997 the agency recovered $14,126,937, but then in
1998, that figure fell substantially to $ 2,104,323.174 Still, the Commission undoubtedly helped a significant number of victims of systemic discrimination. For instance, in the landmark case EEOC v. Mitsubishi Motor Manufacturing,'75 a district court held for the first time that Title VII
authorized the EEOC to bring pattern or practice actions on behalf of
victims alleging sexual harassment.176 The Commission later settled the
case through a consent decree providing that Mitsubishi would pay $34
million to a class of victims, implement procedures to deal effectively
with any future harassment, and appoint a monitor for three years to ensure the company made all required changes. 177 Despite this and other
successes, by the end of the 1990s the agency realized that it had to
come up with creative solutions to handle its staggering workload.
To effectuate these creative solutions, the EEOC launched a private
sector mediation program in 1999.178 The program called for the voluntary and confidential mediation of discrimination complaints even before
the EEOC investigated the underlying charge. The mediation program
proved extremely popular with employers and charging parties; in the
first four years of the plan's existence, the EEOC resolved more than
172. Id.
173. EEOC, EEOC History: 35th Anniversary: 1965-2000, The 1990s: New Laws, New
Strategies, at http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/35th/1990s/index.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2005).
174. Combined Annual Reports, supra note 163, § IV.
175. 990 F. Supp. 1059 (C.D. Il. 1998).
176. Id.at 1071.
177. Furthering the Protection Against Workplace Discrimination and Harassment, supra note
160. In other noteworthy cases, the EEOC attacked male-on-male harassment and disability dis-

crimination in a pattern or practice suit against Long Prairie Packing Company, which resulted in a
$1.9 million settlement for the victims in 1999. Id. The EEOC also continued to challenge systemic
race discrimination. In 1999, the EEOC settled a case with Woodbine Healthcare Center for $2.1
million, which was distributed to sixty-five Filipino class members. Id.
178. EEOC, FY 2003 Performance and Accountability Report, Management's Discussion and
Statistics,
at
Goal
#1,
Mediation
Analysis:
Strategic
http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/plan/par/2003/index.html (last modified October 27, 2004).
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35,000 charges through mediation. 179 The Commission's new emphasis
on mediation continued into the next millennium.
E. 2000 and Beyond
In the current decade, mediation and alternative dispute resolution
have become central to the agency's enforcement efforts - perhaps not
surprising, since the EEOC's charge load continues to grow. 8 ° Current
Chairwoman Cari M. Dominguez, whose five-year term expires in July
2006, has implemented a "Five Point Plan" to guide the agency's operations during her tenure.' 8' The most emphasized of these "Five Points" is
"Promoting and Expanding Mediation/Alternative Dispute Resolution. ' 82 As a recent agency report notes,
[p]romoting and expanding mediation and other types of ADR is the
centerpiece of the EEOC's Five-Point Plan. Our private sector mediation program has demonstrated that disputes can be settled quickly,
amicably and cost-effectively through ADR techniques. 183 We will
build on earlier successes through the continued development of a
179. Id.
180. The EEOC received an average of 81,180 charges each year from 2000-2004. EEOC,
Charge Statistics FY 1992 through FY 2004, at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/charges.html (last visited
Apr. 12, 2005). During 2004 (the most recent period for which charge data is available), the EEOC
received 79,432 charges. Id. Of these charges, 58,328 alleged Title VII violations. EEOC, Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 Charges: FY 1992 Through FY 2004, at
http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/vii.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2005).
at
Plan
for
Fiscal
Years
2004-2009,
181. See
EEOC,
Strategic
http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/plan/strategic-plan-04to09.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2005).
182. See id. The other elements of Dominguez's "Five Point Plan" are (1) "Proactive Prevention" (e.g., "work[ing] to proactively prevent discrimination by providing information and solutions
to members of the public that will help them identify and solve problems before they escalate"); (2)
"Proficient Resolution" (e.g., "evaluat[ing] and improv[ing] every stage of the private sector charge
process and ... collaborat[ing] with other federal agencies in our effort to make the federal complaint process more efficient"); (3) "Strategic Enforcement and Litigation" (e.g., "examin[ing]
emerging workplace trends and issues in both the private and federal sectors and usling] this information to make reasoned and calculated decisions about what issues merit our attention and how we
can better integrate our policy guidance, investigative, litigation and federal coordination functions"); and (4) "EEOC As a Model Workplace" (e.g., "buildling] a model workplace where we can
effectively and efficiently accomplish our goals in an environment conducive to good employment
practices"). Id.
183. Id. Between 1999 and 2003, the EEOC conducted over 52,400 mediations resolving more
than 35,100 charges (69%). EEOC, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, History of the
EEOC Mediation Program, at http://www.eeoc.gov/mediate/history.html (last visited Apr. 17,
2005). Almost all respondent employers (96%) and charging parties (91%) questioned indicated
they would use the EEOC's mediation program again. EEOC, Studies of the Mediation Program, at
http://www.eeoc.gov/mediate/mcd-intro.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2005).
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comprehensive agency-wide ADR program. We will review the pool
of private sector charges eligible for mediation and offer mediation at
various stages of the private sector charge process. We also will work
to expand the number of private employers participating in Universal
Agreements to Mediate, which allow EEOC to attempt mediation int 8all
consents. 4
cases involving an employer so long as the charging party
In addition to strengthening the EEOC's successful mediation program, Chair Dominguez and the EEOC have launched several important

new and creative initiatives. These include the agency's "Freedom to
Compete" initiative - an "outreach, education, and coalition-building
strategy designed to complement the agency's enforcement and litigation
'
- and its "Youth@Work" project - an "innovative naprograms"185
tional outreach and education campaign.., designed to educate young
' 86
In March
workers about their workplace rights and responsibilities."

2005, the Commission launched a pilot "National Contact Center,"
which, if and when fully operational, will purportedly enable members

of the public to call a central number to get answers to EEOC-related
as how to file a charge or to contact or find a local
questions, (such
18 7
office).
EEOC
Meanwhile, the EEOC's litigation efforts continue to garner significant relief for aggrieved individuals. In 2004, the EEOC filed 414
lawsuits against private employers. 88 Of these lawsuits, 279 alleged Ti184. Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2004-2009, supra note 181. A universal agreement to mediate ("UAM") "is an agreement between the EEOC and an employer to mediate all eligible charges
filed against the employer, prior to an agency investigation or litigation." EEOC, Questions and Answers: Universal Agreements to Mediate (UAMs), at http://www.eeoc.gov/mediate/uam.html (last
visited Apr. 12, 2005). As of September 2003, there were "over four hundred UAMs with local employers and sixteen UAMs with regional or national companies." History of the EEOC Mediation
Program, supra note 183.
at
Initiative,
Compete
to
Freedom
the
About
Facts
EEOC,
185. See
http://www.eeoc.gov/initiatives/compete/index.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2005).
Ensuring America's workers the freedom to compete on a level playing field is the essence of EEOC's mission. Shifting demographics and changing business environments
have reshaped today's workplace, requiring the Commission to adopt strategies that are
more responsive to current trends and complexities. [Freedom to Compete] is designed
to build a web of partnerships, liaisons, and alliances that will serve to educate as deterrents to potential discrimination and promoters of compliance and sound employment
practices.
Id.
186. EEOC, Youth@Work, at http://www.eeoc.gov/initiatives/youth/index.html (last visited
Apr. 15, 2005).
187. EEOC, EEOC Launches National Contact Center Pilot to Enhance Customer Service, Improve Efficiency, at http://www.eeoc.gov/press/3-21-05.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2005).
at
2004,
Through
FY
1992
Statistics,
Litigation
EEOC
188. EEOC,
http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/litigation.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2005).
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tle VII violations. 8 9 In 2004, the EEOC secured a record $168.3 million
in monetary benefits for private parties,1 90 of which $133 million was
from Title VII suits. During 2004, the EEOC also brought or settled numerous high-profile class cases - including securing a $54 million settlement in a Title VII case against Morgan Stanley, alleging that this investment bank and brokerage firm committed widespread discrimination
against women with respect to pay, promotion, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. 9 1 In short, not surprisingly, the
EEOC still has enough work to keep it busy.

II. WHAT THE EEOC DOES
Today, the EEOC carries out its enforcement responsibilities in a
myriad of ways. The most important EEOC functions are described below.
A. EEOC'sAdministrative Processes
A core EEOC role is its non-litigation enforcement - its chargeprocessing duties. This administrative process puts the EEOC on notice
that discrimination has occurred (or is occurring), giving it a chance to
remedy the discrimination without resorting to litigation. This administrative process thus at once enables aggrieved individuals to seek redress
for harms suffered, allows employers to resolve workplace disputes earlier and through more informal means, and helps to reduce the federal
court dockets.
1. Charge Filing and Investigation
The administrative process in a Title VII action begins when the
EEOC receives a charge of discrimination1 92 alleging that an individual
or class was discriminated against because of race, national origin, color,

189. Id.
190. Id.
191. EEOC, EEOC and Morgan Stanley Announce Settlement of Sex Discrimination Lawsuit,
at http://www.eeoc.gov/press/7-12-04.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2005).
192. See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.6 (2004). Charges generally must be filed within 180 days of the
alleged Title VII violation. Id. § 1601.13(a)(1). This deadline is extended to 300 days for charges
arising in jurisdictions with state or local laws outlawing the practice, and a "fair employment practices" agency with subject matter jurisdiction over the charge. Id. §§ 1601.13(a)(3), (a)(4)(ii)(A);
see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(l) (2000).
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religion, or sex (or in retaliation for engaging in protected activity). 93 As
the Supreme Court noted in EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 194 the filing of a
charge facilitates the EEOC's ability to vindicate the public's interest in

eradicating employment discrimination by "plac[ing] the EEOC on notice that someone ...believes that an employer has violated... [T]itle
[VII]."' 95 A charge can be filed by any person "claiming to be aggrieved" or by another person, agency, or organization, on behalf of an
aggrieved person.96 In addition, any member of the Commission may

file a charge with the Commission,' and "[any person or organization
charge for an inquiry into
may request the issuance of a Commissioner
98
individual or systematic discrimination.''
Charges can be filed at EEOC field offices or by mail. 199 Although
the EEOC typically uses a special form for charges, the no specific form

is required. The only mandatory requirements for a charge are that it
"shall be in writing and signed and ...verified "20 0 and contain "a written statement sufficiently precise to identify the parties, and to describe
generally the action or practices complained of."20 ' Beyond that, regulations merely suggest what a charge should contain - including, among
other things, the name, address and telephone number of the employer

and the person making the charge, a "clear and concise statement of the
facts, including pertinent dates, constituting the alleged unlawful em-

193. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, 2000e-3 (2000).
194. 466 U.S. 54 (1984).
195. Id. at 68. Given the critical importance of charges, the EEOC has taken the position that
an employee may never waive his or her right to file a charge with the EEOC (e.g., as part of a mediation or arbitration, non-compete, severance or other type of employment agreement). EEOC,
NOTICE NO. 915.002, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON NON-WAIVABLE EMPLOYEE RIGHTS UNDER
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION (EEOC) ENFORCED STATUTES (Apr. 10, 1997),
available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/waiver.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2005).
196. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.7 (2004). A charge can only be withdrawn by the claimant, with the
consent of the Commission. Id. § 1601.10.
197. Id. § 1601.11 (a).
198. Id. § 1601.6(a). Commissioner Charges
are integral to EEOC's law enforcement mission and are an important complement to the
enforcement of the law through individually initiated charges. They recognize that some
types and incidents of illegal discrimination will not be the subject of individual charges
but, nonetheless, constitute serious violations of the laws that should be the subject of
enforcement action.
EEOC, PRIORITY CHARGE HANDLING PROCEDURES § III.B(Bureau of Nat'l Affairs 2003). Commissioner charges may involve systemic or individualized discrimination. They may also be either
broad or narrow in scope, but will typically involve priority or other novel issues. Id. § IlI.C. 1.
199. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.8 (2004).
200. Id. §§ 1601.1 l(a), 1601.9. "Verified" means sworn to or affirmed before a notary public
or a designated EEOC representative or other authorized person. See id. § 1601.3.
201. Id. § 1601.12(b).
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ployment practices," and the approximate number of employer's employees (information which allows the Commission to determine if the
employer is covered by the statutes).2 °2 Charges "may be amended to
cure technical defects or omissions, including failure to verify the
charge, or to clarify and amplify the allegations ....
Any amendments - and any new allegations of unlawful employment practices related to or growing out of the subject of the original charge - will "relate back to the date the charge was first received., 20 4 Within ten days of
receiving a charge, the EEOC must serve a copy of it on the employer,
unless doing so "would impede the law enforcement functions of the
20 5
Commission.,
The EEOC triages charges using guidelines established in its 1995
"Priority Charge Handling Procedures" ("PCHP"). °6 Under the PCHP,
charges are sorted into "A," "B," and "C" categories.20 7 When an initial
review of a charge reveals that it is "more likely than not" that discrimination has occurred, the charge is classified as Category A. 20 8 These
Category A charges receive priority treatment and are investigated
promptly. 20 9 If, after the initial charge review, it appears that the EEOC
will need additional evidence to determine whether the employer has
violated Title VII, the charge is classified as Category B. 210 Category B
charges are investigated if the EEOC's resources permit. 21' Finally, if a
charge reflects an obviously meritless case, or one outside the EEOC's
jurisdiction, it is classified as Category C. 2t 2 These charges are not
investigated and are promptly dismissed.2 13
Trained investigators in EEOC field offices investigate Category A
and Category B charges.2 14 The nature of each investigation depends on
the particulars of the charge. In general, an appropriate investigation is
one that gathers enough information to enable the EEOC field office to
determine whether "a statute has been violated or that ...further inves202.
203.
204.

Id. § 1601.12 (a).
Id. § 1601.12(b).
Id. This "relation back" provision is critical when the timeliness of a charge filing is at

issue.
205.
206.

Id. § 1601.14(a).
See PRIORITY CHARGE HANDLING PROCEDURES, supra note 198.

207.

Id. at Introduction.

208. Id.
209. Id. § II.A.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. § II.C..
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tigation is not likely to result in a finding that there is reasonable cause
to believe that a statute has been violated., 21 5 Some investigations are
completed as soon as an investigator reads a charge. In other cases, an
investigator may request position statements or evidence from the alleged victim and employer and from the person or entity who made the
charge, if it was not the victim. 21 6 On occasion, investigators hold factfinding conferences with the parties. 2 7 The EEOC also has the authority
to issue subpoenas requiring, as part of its charge investigations, "(1)
[t]he attendance and testimony of witnesses, (2) [t]he production of evidence including but not limited to books, records, correspondence, or
documents in the possession or under the control of the person subpoenaed and (3) [a]ccess
to evidence for the purposes of examination and
218
the right to copy.

2. Charge Resolution and Conciliation
After the EEOC completes its investigation of a charge, it issues a
"letter of determination" to the parties. 219 If the Commission cannot determine whether Title VII has been violated, the letter simply states that,
based on the EEOC's investigation, the Commission "is unable to conclude that the information obtained establishes violations" of Title
VII. 220 The Commission also gives the claimant a "notice of right to

sue," indicating
that he or she has ninety days to file suit in federal dis22
trict court. '
215. Id. § ID.I. As the PCHP note, field offices are charged with developing
a flexible process under which investigators will seek only that amount of evidence
needed to make an informed decision as to whether it is more likely than not that a violation of the statute may be found. This will avoid misapplying resources by overinvestigating charges that could be resolved with less information, or by pursuing cases
that are facially non-meritorious. At the same time, it will have the beneficial effect of
shifting the agency's limited resources to cases that are the most likely to fall within the
enforcement plans and otherwise result in findings of violations.
Id.
216. 29C.F.R. § 1601.15(a) (2004).
217. Id. § 1601.15(c). Fact finding conferences take place prior to "a determination on a charge
of discrimination." Id.
218. Id. § 1601.16(a).
219. Id. § 1601.19(a).
220. PRIORITY CHARGE HANDLING PROCEDURES, supra note 198, § II.F.I.
This letter also
states, however, that its "no cause" finding "does not certify that the respondent is in compliance"
with Title VII. Id.
221. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.19(b) (2004). Any person claiming to be aggrieved can request that the
EEOC issue a "notice of right to sue" 180 days after the underlying charge was filed (or earlier if
the EEOC determines that it will not be able to complete its administrative processing of the charge
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If, on the other hand, the EEOC does find "reasonable cause" to believe that an unlawful employment practice under Title VII has occurred,
its letter of determination will state this. 222 The EEOC will then try to

obtain affirmative relief and eliminate the unlawful employment practice, through informal methods, including conciliation. 23 The Commis224
sion and the parties will sign a conciliation agreement if successful.
The EEOC must then obtain proof that the employer is complying with
Title VII in accordance with the agreement before closing the charge
file.225 If, by contrast, conciliation fails, the EEOC may decide to litigate
the matter on its own.2 26 If the Commission decides not do so, a "notice
of right to sue" is issued to the person claiming to be aggrieved.22 7 The
steps the Commission takes when it has decided to pursue litigation are
discussed, infra at II.B.3.
3. Mediation
At any point during the EEOC's administrative process, the parties
may voluntarily agree to have the EEOC attempt to mediate the charge.
Indeed, the
EEOC offers mediation soon after the charge has been filed and prior
to further investigation. EEOC evaluates each charge to see if it is
appropriate for mediation. Charges which EEOC has determined to be
without merit are not eligible for mediation. In most instances, charges
which require additional investigation on the merits are eligible. The
parties may request mediation, however, at any stage of the administrative process.22g

within 180 days). Id. §§ 1601.28(a)(l)-(a)(2).
222. Id. § 1501.21(a).
223. Id. § 1601.24(a).
224. Id.
225. Id. § 1601.24(c).
226. Id. § 1601.27.
227. Id. § 1601.28(b).
228. History of the EEOC Mediation Program, supra note 183 and accompanying text.
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B. EEOCLitigation

The EEOC as "Master of Its Own Case"
The EEOC is also committed to vigorous enforcement of the statutes over which it has jurisdiction, and "will not hesitate to seek appropriate legal remedies through litigation when warranted., 229 The EEOC's
general approach to litigation, not surprisingly, is a direct reflection of
its unique enforcement mission. While it can and often does seek relief
on behalf of specific victims of discrimination, the EEOC "does not
function simply as a vehicle for conducting litigation on behalf of priIn other words, the agency "does not [simply] stand
vate parties ....
in the employee's shoes. 2 3 1 As the Supreme Court first explained in
General Telephone Co. v. EEOC:
the EEOC is not merely a proxy for the victims of discrimination and
[its] enforcement suits should not be considered representative actions .... Although the EEOC can secure specific relief... on behalf
of discrimination victims, the agency is guided by "the overriding public interest in equal employment opportunity... asserted through direct Federal enforcement." When the EEOC acts, albeit at the behest of
and for the benefit of specific individuals, it acts also to232vindicate the
public interest in preventing employment discrimination.
The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed these principles in EEOC v.
Waffle House, Inc. 233 Waffle House had required prospective employees
to sign an application agreeing to submit employment disputes to binding arbitration.2 34 Charging party, Eric Baker, signed the agreement and
went to work for Waffle House as a grill operator.235 When he suffered a
seizure at work, Waffle House fired him. 236 Baker then filed a charge
with the EEOC alleging that his discharge constituted a violation of the
ADA. 237 The EEOC subsequently filed suit on Baker's behalf.238 Waffle
Policy
Resolution
Alternative
Dispute
229. EEOC,
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/adrstatement.html (July 17, 1995).
230. Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 368 (1977).
231. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 297 (2002).
232. 446 U.S. 318, 326 (1980) (quoting 118 Cong. Rec. 4941 (1972)).
233. 534 U.S. 279 (2002).

Statement,

at

234. Id. at 282-83.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 283.
237. Id.; 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
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House tried to block the suit,239 arguing that because Baker had agreed to
submit to binding arbitration240when he was hired, the EEOC could not
seek relief on Baker's behalf.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the question of whether an
agreement between an employer and an employee to arbitrate employment-related disputes could preclude the EEOC from pursuing victimspecific judicial relief (such as backpay, reinstatement, and other damages) on the employee's behalf.241 The Supreme Court held that it could
not. The Court explained that under Title VII (and the ADA), once a
charging party files a charge with the EEOC, then the "EEOC is in
command of the process. 2 42 The EEOC essentially has a right of first
refusal over a charging party's claim, and the charging party cannot file
suit on his or her own behalf until he or she has requested and received a
notice of right to sue from the EEOC.243 If the EEOC decides to litigate
the case itself, however, the charging party "has no independent cause of
action," although he or she may intervene in the EEOC's suit. 244 In addition, the EEOC could decide to litigate cases on behalf of a charging
party even after the charging party "has disavowed any desire to seek relief. 2 45 Thus, the Supreme Court stated, Title VII
clearly makes the EEOC the master of its own case and confers on the
agency the authority to evaluate the strength of the public interest at
stake .... [I]t is the public agency's province. .. to determine whether
public resources should be committed to the recovery of victimspecific relief. And if the agency makes that determination, the statu246
tory text unambiguously authorizes it to proceed in a judicial forum.
For these reasons, and because the EEOC was not a party to the arbitration agreement at issue, the Supreme Court held that the EEOC
could not be required to relinquish its statutory authority to file a civil
suit seeking victim-specific relief - notwithstanding the fact that the
victim had waived the right to pursue relief in a judicial forum on his or
her own behalf.247 "[W]henever the EEOC chooses from among the
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.

Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 283.
Id. at 282-85.
Id. at 284.
Id. at 282.
Id. at 291.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 291-92.
Id. at 294.
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many charges filed each year to bring an enforcement action in a particular case, the agency may be seeking to vindicate a public interest, not
simply provide make-whole relief for the employee, even when it pursues entirely victim-specific relief., 248 Accordingly, the EEOC should
and does have "the authority to pursue victim-specific relief regardless
of the forum that the employer and employee have chosen to resolve
their disputes. ' ' 2 49 The Supreme Court concluded that "[t]o hold otherwise would undermine the detailed enforcement scheme created by
Congress simply to give greater effect to an agreement between private
parties25 that does not even contemplate the EEOC's statutory func,
tion. 0
C. The Office of General Counsel
The EEOC implements its statutory litigation function via the General Counsel, who is appointed by the President and confirmed by the
Senate for a four-year term. 25' According to the EEOC, the mission of its
Office of General Counsel "is to conduct litigation on behalf of the
agency to obtain relief for victims of employment discrimination and to
ensure compliance with statutes the EEOC is charged with enforcing.' 252
The Office of General Counsel contains legal staff who work at EEOC
headquarters in Washington, D.C. (lawyers who are organized into specialized subcomponents, such as Systemic Litigation Services and Appellate Services), and legal units in 23 different EEOC District Offices
by a Regional Attorney who oversees trial
(each of which is supervised
253
attorneys and paralegals).
A recent EEOC report describes the operations and purpose of the
Office of General Counsel this way:
We bring lawsuits on behalf of multiple victims of discrimination
without having to meet class certification requirements applicable to
private litigants. Through consent decrees we institute broad-based eq248. Id. at 296.
249. Id. at 295.
250. Id. at 296. The Supreme Court did state that because the only issue before it was "whether
the fact that Baker has signed a mandatory arbitration agreement limits the remedies available to the
EEOC," there "is an open question whether a settlement or arbitration judgment would affect the
validity of the EEOC's claim or the character of relief the EEOC may seek." Id. at 297.
251. See42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(b)(l) (2000).
252. EEOC, Office of General Counsel Fiscal Year 2003 Annual Report, § IA, at
http://www.eeoc.gov/litigation/03annrept/index.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2005).
I.C.
253. Id. §§ I.B.,
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uitable remedies calculated to prevent future discrimination that private litigants have less incentive to pursue. We bring cases that have
the potential to develop the law in the public interest, and through our
amicus curiae program offer our views and expertise to courts deciding
issues of public importance in private litigation. We publicize the results of our litigation so that others can learn of their rights and obligations under the law and the potential consequences of noncompliance.
We maintain a litigation presence in every region of the country. We
seek to remove barriers to employees' access to redress for discrimination, such as predispute, compulsory arbitration agreements that deny
discrimination victims the process afforded in the federal courts. We
file suit on behalf of individuals who otherwise would be compelled to
bring their claims to an arbitrator rather than a court. We obtain justice
by the private bar
for individuals who could not afford representation
254
as the cost of litigation continues to rise.

D. The EEOC's Litigation Priorities
In pursuit of its stated goals, the EEOC files suit each year in only a
rather small percentage of the charges it receives. Over the past decade,
for example, the EEOC filed an average of 335 suits on the merits per
25525
year, out of an average of 81,000 charges received 5 6 How, then, does
the EEOC select these few cases?
The EEOC's National Enforcement Plan answers this question. It
identifies the following three priority areas for enforcement:

0

Cases involving violations of established anti-discrimination
principles, whether on an individual or systemic basis ...
which by their nature could have a potential257significant impact beyond the parties to a particular dispute.

254. Id. § I1.A.
255. EEOC,
Litigation
Statistics:
FY
1992
Through
2004,
at
http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/litigation.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2005). On average, 233 of these suits
involved a Title VII claim. Id.
256. Charge Statistics FY 1992 through FY 2004, supra note 180.
257. National Enforcement Plan, supra note 166, § lI.A. These include (1) "[c]ases involving
repeated and/or egregious discrimination, including harassment, or facially discriminatory policies;"
and (2) "[c]hallenges to broad-based employment practices affecting many employees or applicants
for employment, such as cases alleging patterns of discrimination in hiring, lay-offs, and job mobility, including 'glass-ceiling' cases, and/or pay, including claims under the Equal Pay Act." Id.
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*

Cases having the potential of promoting the development of
law supporting the anti-discrimination purposes of the statutes
enforced by the Commission 258 and

*

Cases involving the integrity or effectiveness of the Commisparticularly the investigation and
sion's enforcement process,
259
conciliation of charges.

In recent years, the EEOC's litigation program has continued to
emphasize high-impact litigation. It routinely brings cases where "the
defendant implemented policies or practices that systematically and intentionally discriminated against a large group of victims, numbering
into the hundreds or even thousands." 260 At the same time, the EEOC
carefully selects individual claims that will help it ensure "justice pre-

vails in all areas of the country," "strengthen ties to local communities,"
and garner "prospective, equitable relief geared towards preventing future discrimination. 2 6t The EEOC also targets cases where employers

have threatened "unfettered access to civil rights enforcement mechanisms, including individuals' rights to report discriminatory practices to
their employers, file charges of discrimination, and participation in
Commission proceedings .... ,262
In addition to filing its own suits against discriminating employers
in district courts (and pursuing all necessary and appropriate related appeals), the EEOC also has a robust amicus curiae practice. The Appellate
Services branch of the Office of General Counsel files numerous amicus
258. Id. § II.B. These include (1) "[c]laims presenting unresolved issues of statutory interpretation under one or more of the statutes enforced by the Commission;" and (2) "[c]ases involving
legal issues where there is a conflict in the federal circuit courts on a Plan priority or in which the
Commission is seeking Supreme Court resolution of such issue." Id.
259. Id. These include (1) "[c]ases involving allegations of retaliation against persons for participating in Commission proceedings or opposing unlawful employment discrimination, particularly cases where the scope of the statutory protection against retaliation is an issue;" (2) "[c]ases
presenting challenges to Commission policy declarations, such as guidelines, regulations or policy
guidance;" (3) "[c]ases protecting Commission access to information, including subpoena enforcement proceedings and proceedings to preserve or prevent the loss or destruction of evidence .... ;"
(4) "[c]ases involving allegations of a material breach of an agreement to which the Commission
was a party settling an earlier proceeding" and (5) "[c]ases involving alleged violations of the
Commission's recordkeeping and reporting requirements where there is reason to believe that there
may be another violation of statutes enforced by the Commission." Id.
260. EEOC, Office of General Counsel Fiscal Year 2003 Annual Report, Summary of Fiscal
Year 2003 Accomplishments, § lI.C, at http://www.eeoc.gov/litigation/03annrpt/index.html#IIC.
261. Id. § II.E.
262. Id. § lI.D.
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briefs in the federal courts of appeals in cases brought initially by private
the julitigants. The purpose of this practice, of course, is to help shape
263
diciary's view of relevant employment discrimination statutes.
E. EEOC's Other Functions
The EEOC does much more than simply process charges and pursue litigation. For example, the EEOC's Office of Legal Counsel (and
the Commission in general) has formulated, and continues to release, a
plethora of regulations and policy guidance, which interpret and enforce
Title VII (and other federal employment laws).2 64 The EEOC makes representatives available at no cost to perform training and outreach to educate employees and employers about their rights and responsibilities under federal employment discrimination law.265 The EEOC also publishes
numerous studies and reports analyzing charge-filing and other employment trends.2 66
III. WHY THE EEOC (STILL) MATTERS
Four decades after the enactment of Title VII and the creation of the
EEOC, the question arises - does the agency still matter? As discussed
below, we believe that despite all of the EEOC's shortcomings, the
agency continues to play an irreplaceable role in the battle to eradicate

263. See id. § II.F.
The Office of General Counsel's litigation program is an important tool for shaping the
growth of civil rights law. Whether through litigating enforcement suits or participating
as amicus curiae in private litigation, we urge courts at all levels to accept our views on
novel and complex legal issues of public importance.
Id.
264. EEOC, EEOC Regulations, at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/regs/index.htm (last visited
at
Guidances
and Related
Documents,
12,
2005); EEOC,
Enforcement
Apr.
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/guidance.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2005). Most notably, the EEOC is
drafting a "New Compliance Manual" which, when completed, will replace EEOC's existing substantive guidelines. Some chapters from the New Compliance Manual have already been issued,
including Employee Benefits, Retaliation, Compensation Discrimination, National Origin Discrimination. See EEOC, New Compliance Manual, at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/compliance.html (last
visited Apr. 12, 2005).
265. The EEOC performs both free and fee-based training and outreach. See EEOC, Outreach,
Education, and Technical Assistance, at http://www.eeoc.gov/outreach/index.html (last visited Apr.
Programs,
at
EEOC,
No
Cost
Outreach
12,
2005);
see
also
http://www.eeoc.gov/outreach/nocost.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2005).
266. See, e.g., EEOC, Special Reports, at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/reports/index.htnd (offering EEOC reports addressing a variety of topics, such as "Diversity in the Media" and "Women of
Color: Their Employment in the Private Sector") (last visited Apr. 12, 2005).
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employment discrimination. We briefly address below what we believe
are some of the EEOC's most significant limitations and deficiencies.
We then give the four reasons why, despite these failings, the EEOC still
matters.
As our cursory review of the agency's history reveals, the agency's
perennial struggle has been to determine how to most efficiently allocate
its scarce resources given, the backbreaking number of charges it receives each year and its annual budget shortfalls. The EEOC has labored
under a "hiring freeze" for the last three years.2 67 This has created numerous attorney vacancies in headquarters and field offices,2 68 which has
hindered the agency's ability to investigate and bring cases. The
agency's effectiveness has also been undermined by a lack of any kind
of systematic training for its employees, which can be attributed, in part,
to the agency's budget woes.269
In our view, the agency should continue to use innovative methods
to deal with this chronic problem (e.g., the highly successful mediation
program and Priority Charge Handling Procedures) but must also come
up with new approaches for combating the constant fiscal crunch. For
instance, given the agency's staffing and funding shortages, the EEOC
ought to devote more of its resources to fighting systemic discrimination, even if doing so undermines the EEOC's ability to take on cases of
individual discrimination. We believe that the EEOC should focus on
systemic discrimination cases because the agency has the expertise and
the resources to shoulder the burden of bringing these cases, which are
complicated, expensive, and time consuming, and because these cases
have the potential for the greatest impact on the public. We also believe
that the agency should be more consistent in choosing high-quality meritorious cases to litigate. Although the agency has promulgated parameters (e.g., the National Enforcement Plan) for selecting cases to litigate,
it is unclear whether the EEOC - with its many moving parts and myriad of field offices - is still following these guidelines. This may be one
267. Jeffrey A. Smith, EEOC, A Message From the Chief Financial Officer, at
http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/plan/par/20O4/cfo-message.html (Nov. 15, 2004).
268. General Counsel Fiscal Year 2003 Annual Report, supra note 260, § II.E.1 (stating that
between 2001 and 2003, the Office of General Counsel's field staff decreased from 383 to 332 and
the number of attorneys decreased from 248 to 210).
269. National Academy of Public Administration, Panel Report prepared for the EEOC, Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission: Organizing for the Future, Staff Management and Realignment, at http://www.napawash.org/Pubs/EEOC_REPORTNew.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2005)
("EEOC's training budget has varied from substantial ($3.5 million for FY 1999 and $2.7 million in
FY 2001) to modest ($745,347 in FY 2000 and $1.3 million for FY 2002). Such variations make it
difficult to develop and sustain an effective program.").
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reason why the merits of the EEOC's cases seem to vary widely. Adhering more closely to the pre-defined critical litigation criteria adopted in
the NEP should help the EEOC target its litigation efforts more effectively, whatever the fiscal climate.
While the agency, at times, operates at a frustratingly slow pace and
could bring more systemic discrimination cases, we think that on balance it fulfills its statutory mandate remarkably well. Indeed, the EEOC
today may be more necessary and relevant than ever before. In our view,
there are four main reasons why the EEOC, flawed as it is, is an essential
mechanism for the enforcement of Title VII and other employment discrimination statutes.
First, it is clear that employment discrimination still thrives in all
sectors of the American workforce. Each year an overwhelming number
of individuals in the private sector and those working for state and local
governments - an average of 81,000 each year over the past decade file charges of discrimination. 270 The Commission continues to receive
tens of thousands of charges of race and sex discrimination, some of
which involve egregious acts of harassment, disparate treatment, and retaliation. 271 Although not all of these charges are meritorious, the sheer
number of them provides evidence that employment discrimination remains a stubborn and intractable problem, even forty years after Title
VII's enactment. The continued existence of discrimination in the workplace underscores the general need for a federal agency whose mission is
to combat it.
Second, the Commission's administrative process - including
charge intake, investigation, mediation, and conciliation - plays a critical role in the battle to eradicate discrimination. Significantly, the EEOC
is the only federal agency responsible for receiving and processing
charges of unlawful employment discrimination - and the only agency
responsible for investigating these complaints and conciliating them.272
270. Charge Statistics FY 1992 Through FY 2004, supra note 180.
271. See, e.g., EEOC v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 383 F.3d 1280, 1283 (1 Ith Cir. 2004) (alleging
that two hundred African American workers were subjected in the workplace to hangman's nooses,
racially inflammatory graffiti, and racial slurs); Williams v. ConAgra Poultry Co., 378 F.3d 790,
797-98 (8th Cir. 2004) (Title VII hostile work environment case in which witnesses reported black
dolls hung from nooses and invitations to Ku Klux Klan hunting trips where black employees were
encouraged to come and be "hunted").
272. See, e.g., Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 368 (1977).
[U]nder the procedural structure created by the 1972 amendments, the EEOC does not
function simply as a vehicle for conducting litigation on behalf of private parties; it is a
federal administrative agency charged with the responsibility of investigating claims of
employment discrimination and settling disputes, if possible, in an informal, noncoercive
fashion. Id.
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Accordingly, the Commission performs a critical public service by keeping track of the number of charges filed each year and by categorizing
and analyzing them. This provides important information about the nature of discriminatory practices that persist - or are believed to persist
- in the workplace. In addition, while the agency's charge investigatory
process continues to take longer than anyone would like, the investigation itself plays a critical role, by allowing the agency to use its resources and trained investigators to make the initial attempt to uncover
discrimination. Investigations also routinely uncover other forms and incidents of discrimination that may have gone unreported (especially in
harassment cases).273 Even when the EEOC cannot conclude that discrimination has occurred and issues a finding of "no cause," the agency
has arguably performed a service by allowing disgruntled individuals to
tell their story and to find out whether the EEOC believes their cases
have merit. The Commission also facilitates the early resolution of
charges -

even before an investigation begins -

by offering a volun-

tary mediation program.
When the EEOC does find "cause," the agency provides the critical
service of trying to conciliate the charge. For the individuals whose
charges are resolved through conciliation, the Commission's efforts
spare the litigants the time and expense involved in finding and hiring a
private attorney. Conciliation also serves the interests of employers by
resolving disputes before costly litigation begins and before any back
pay awards accrue. Finally, conciliation - like mediation - assists the
courts by resolving disputes before a civil complaint is filed. Because
employment discrimination claims comprise almost 10% of the federal
docket, this is no minor accomplishment.27 4 The Commission's conciliation and mediation efforts thus fulfill Congress' intention that employment discrimination claims be resolved, whenever possible, through informal means.275
273.

General Counsel Fiscal Year 2003 Annual Report, supra note 260, § II; see also EEOC v.

Dial Corp., 156 F. Supp. 2d 926, 930 (N.D. Ill.
2001) (alleging sexual harassment lawsuit on behalf

of a class of women originated with a single charge alleging co-worker sexual harassment); EEOC
v. Robert L. Reeves & Assoc., No. 00-10515, 2002 WL 1634013, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Feb 19, 2002)
(alleging sexual harassment and pregnancy discrimination on behalf of a class of women which
originated as a single charge of pregnancy discrimination), rev'd, Nos. 02-55928 & 02-56179, 2003
WL 21480317 (9th Cir. 2003). "Any violations that the EEOC ascertains in the course of a reasonable investigation of the charging party's complaint are actionable." Gen. Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446
U.S. 318, 331 (1980).
274. Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs

Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429, 432 (2004). Seventy percent of the
cases are brought under Title VII. Id. at 433.
275. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2000) (stating that if the Commission finds "reasonable cause to
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The third reason why the EEOC remains highly relevant today is
that, unlike private litigants, the Commission litigates in the public interest. As the Supreme Court noted, "the EEOC is not merely a proxy for
the victims of discrimination.276 Instead,"[w]hen the EEOC acts, albeit at
the behest of and for the benefit of specific individuals, it acts also to
vindicate the public interest in preventing employment discrimination. '' 277 Accordingly, when making litigation decisions, the Commission
is guided by what is in the best interest of the public, which is not necessarily synonymous with what is in the best interest of particular individuals. What this means in a tangible sense is that Commission attorneys do not have to worry about attorneys' fees or costs when deciding
whether to pursue litigation or to settle a case. EEOC attorneys can also
bring suit without having to worry about meeting the requirements for
class certification that govern private litigations.278
Also, in the public interest, the Commission uses consent decrees to
institute broad equitable remedies intended to prevent future discrimination against other employees, a remedy that private litigants have less
incentive to pursue.27 9 In addition, by publicizing its litigation results,
the Commission educates both employers and employees about the law
and the EEOC's role in enforcing it. 280 Further, as the Supreme Court

recognized in Waffle House, the EEOC is empowered to bring lawsuits
to vindicate the public interest, regardless of whether parties have agreed
to arbitrate their claims. 28 ' This power of protection over the public interest is underscored by the Commission's position that it may pursue
282
litigation even when an individual has disavowed any desire for relief.
The EEOC represents the public interest mainly by bringing individual and systemic claims of discrimination. Although individuals can
attempt to find an attorney to take their case, for many - especially
those who have been terminated or denied employment - the costs associated with hiring an attorney and pursuing a lawsuit are often prohibitively expensive. This is especially true when, as frequently occurs in
believe that the charge is true, the Commission shall endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment practices by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion").
276.
277.

General Telephone, 446 U.S. at 326.
Id.

278.
279.

General Counsel Fiscal Year 2003 Annual Report, supra note 260, § II.
Id. at Statement from the General Counsel.

280.

Id. § II.A.

281. See EEOC v. Waffle House, 534 U.S. 279, 291-92 (2002) (noting that the EEOC is "master of its own case" and has "the authority to evaluate the strength of the public interest at stake" and
to bring suit in a judicial forum).
282. See id. at 250.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol22/iss2/11

36

Occhialino and Vail: Why the EEOC (Still) Matters

20051

WHY THE EEOC (STILL) MA TTERS

ADA cases, the case requires costly expert testimony. In addition to being discouraged by the cost of litigation, many individuals - and private
attorneys - may forego litigation because private litigants face such
dismal odds in court. 83 Unlike private litigants, the EEOC can more easily absorb the cost and risk of pursuing novel legal arguments.
The importance of the EEOC in vindicating the public interest is
even more pronounced when bringing systemic discrimination cases.
The EEOC is the only federal agency that gathers employment information (through EEO-1 reports). Consequently, only the EEOC has a birdseye view of the workforce that enables the agency to identify and target
employers that engage in systemic discrimination. Just as importantly,
systemic discriminathe EEOC has the expertise and resources to bring284
complex.
and
expensive
often
are
which
tion cases,
Finally, the EEOC remains vital because it is "a veritable repository
of institutional knowledge and expertise ' '285 of employment discrimination. The EEOC shares its expertise through its significant outreach efforts. It studies employment discrimination trends and issues important
policy guidance for interpreting federal employment discrimination
laws. The Supreme Court itself has stated that the Commission's sexual
harassment guidelines interpreting Title VII "constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance. 2 86 Through its appellate amicus program, the
EEOC regularly offers its experienced views to the federal courts by fil28
ing briefs in novel and noteworthy cases. 287 In all these ways, the EEOC
acts and serves as a consistent and informed voice to which employers,
employees, interest groups, and the courts can look for illumination.
283. See Cleremont & Schwab, supra note 274, at 441, 443-45, 448-51. Data shows that employment discrimination plaintiffs face long odds in court, at the pretrial stage, during or after trial,
and on appeal. From 1998-2001, Title VII plaintiffs are shown to have prevailed only about 2% of
the time before trial, roughly 36% of the time during or after a jury trial, and only about 25% of the
time during or after a bench trial. Id.
284. See, e.g., Maurice E. R. Munroe, The EEOC: Patternand PracticeImperfect, 13 YALE L.
& POL'Y REV. 219, 220 (1995) ("While sometimes these [systemic discrimination] practices are
addressed by class action lawsuits, individuals do not usually have the information or resources to
identify these practices and litigate against them.").
285. Dinkins v. Charoen Pokphand USA, Inc., 133 F. Supp. 2d 1237, 1244 (M.D. Ala. 2001).
286. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
287. Clark v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 400 F.3d 341, 349 (6th Cir. 2005) (agreeing with the
Commission's argument, as amicus curiae, that employer may be liable for supervisor harassment if
a supervisor witnesses harassment but fails to report it, as required by company policy); see also
Emory v. Astrazeneca Pharm., 401 F.3d 174, 180 (3d Cir. 2005) (noting "that the EEOC has filed a
31-page amicus curiae brief in this case imploring us to recognize that conscientious application of
the law demands reversal of the District Court's conclusion" and concurring with the Commission's
position).
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We therefore conclude that the EEOC still fulfills a singular, if imperfect, function in the enforcement of Title VII and the eradication of
employment discrimination. Forty years after its birthday, the EEOC
(still) matters.
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